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Truth and Illusion
SUZANNE LAST STONE

SEVERAL YEARS AGO I was invited to comment on various rabbinic
texts about true and false prophecy. One text, in particular, resisted quick
interpretation. The text, hSanbeJri11 89a, begins: "Rabbi Isaac said: The
same communication [dtgnon, from the Latin dt'gnum, meaning watchword]
occurs to several prophets, yet no two prophets prophesy the same communication [,1t'g11011]." Rabbi Isaac cites Jeremiah and Obadiah, who each
delivered the same message from God but expressed it with stylistic variation. Rabbi Isaac's comment on the literary record of prophecy is identified by the Talmud as the test of true and false prophecy used by the
King of Judah to judge the four hundred prophets of King Ahab false.
All predicted victory in battle "with one mouth," in identical language
(1 Kgs 22).
Is the prophet's individual speech the work of the prophet or of God?
Moshe Greenberg cites Rabbi Isaac to show that premoderns, although
formally adhering to the doctrine of divine dictation, readily conceded the
human contribution in prophecy when reflecting on the literary evidence.
Rabbi Isaac's comment, however, recalls midrashic descriptions of the
overflow of meaning in a
divine statement, which human speech
cannot replicate. The varied formulations of a single message from God
may be one more example of the multiplicity engendered from singularity
that is a mark of divine speech. In either case, how does the Talmud
understand the relationship of the prophet's speech to truth? Is individual
expression a test of true prophecy or of the true prophet, pointing to the
qualities of mind or character of those who are trusted to convey God's
word? Or is the test, as other rabbinic texts suggest, an application of the
laws of testimonial witnesses to prophets, who also claim private knowledge of the ttuth?
Still other questions are suggested by the continuation of this talmudic
passage, which more clearly focuses on the human factor in prophecy.
The Talmud searches for a legal justification for punishing Zedekiah, who
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was among the four hundred. Zedekiah, the rabbis scrupulously note, did
not utter a false prophecy with the intention to deceive. He was seduced
by a lying spirit sent by God. "\Vhat could he have done?" the Talmud
asks. And the Talmud answers: "He ought to have scrutinized the matter
in light of Rabbi Isaac's tradition" that no two prophets deliver even the
same message from God in identical language. The Talmud adopts Rabbi
Isaac's tradition as a normative test of true prophecy, binding on the
prophet himself. But why can't the prophet take his own spontaneous
experience and sincere apprehension of prophecy as true? Ancient and
modern psychology converge here. The Talmud implicitly recognizes that
the human capacity to perceive the difference between a genuine external
event and illusion is fragile. Here, a lying spirit deceives. Elsewhere in
Scripture, false prophecy is said to have its origins in the wishes, dreams,
or imagination of the prophet and is often stimulated by a need to express
the agreeable (Jer 23). So, the Talmud imposes a duty on the prophet
himself to search his truth claim for error, in light
objective methods
the law deems truth-acquiring.
With this passage, the Talmud invites us to reflect on the human capacity and obligation to discern and convey the truth, a question as relevant
for moderns as for the ancients. How do we ascertain the truth of claims
of private knowledge that, as Kant said, "has its grounds in the particular
character of the subject?" \Vhom do we trust to speak truthfully in public
life and how do we understand the relationship of truth to self-expression
and individuality? How do those who hold themselves out as transmitters
of knowledge or true information in society resist not only external pressures such as popular sentiment but also internal forces of self-deception,
wishful thinking, and fantasy?
One final question: \Vhy does this particular talmudic text so engage
the attention of a writer on Jewish and comparative legal theory? No
doubt, the text appeals because it invites modern questions and because
its interpretation demands the bringing together of many disciplines from
the legal and literary to the epistemological and psychological. But the
more complex answer lies in personal biography and begins with an encounter with three texts, unrelated to matters Jewish, that captured my
imagination over thirty years ago. Two are works by the classicist Eric
Dodds, Papan and ChriAian in an A_9e a/ An..:icty ( 1965) and The Greekc1 and
the lrratumal (1971), and the third is Hans Jonas's The GnoJtic Religion
(1970).
Each book describes a critical moment in the late antique world: the
collapse
the classical Greek humanist view of a rationally ordered,
neutral cosmos and, with it, the rise of a variety of magical practices and
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religious attitudes, including apocalypticism and gnosticism. The "Return
of the Irrational" in hellenistic society, Dodds wrote, came about from
"the fear of freedom, the unconscious flight from the heavy burden of
individual choice that a free society lays upon its members" (Greek, anJ
the lrratwnal, p. 252). Dodds later wrote of the anxiety that gripped pagans and Christians, the distrust of"daylight reality" and ordinary human
experience, when the sense of the withdrawal of divinity from the world
became palpable. Jonas described the feeling of alienation from the
world, homelessness, and near nihilism that the Christian gnostics experienced. The psychological mood of that age struck a chord of recognition,
one that occurs when two ages momentarily seem to align. For both authors, the late antique age was a parallel of our own, civilizations that had
become dominated by impersonal principles, technology, and materialism
and lacked an organic sense of community. Dodds and Jonas strove to
understand the ancients through the lens of the modern predicament and,
even more boldly, to read the ancients' experience as a cautionary lesson
for their own age of anxiety.
I also f'elt a sense of empathy with that age and intended to make
Jewish religious attitudes in late antiquity the center of my work. In my
all too brief days as a student of early rabbinic religion, nothing was
more fascinating than uncovering evidence of "irrationalism," not only in
Jewish sectarian literature but in rabbinic texts, including the persistence
of prophecy, magic, and the power of dreams in the rabbinic imagination.
My fascination with both the early rabbinic period and "the irrational"
persists to this day. But legal training and an academic position within a
community that values the role of law in society subtly changed my focus.
The goal of law is to regulate irrational forces in society and to subject
them to the skeptical, sober, and reflective light of day. Law, these days,
is often criticized as overly traditional, cold, and objective, preserving a
past that no longer speaks to the present and putting an arbitrary end to
the search for truth for the sake of order. The rule of law is, however, a
normative ideal, one of critical moment in our new age of anxiety, if not
terror, when irrational forces have entered into the heart of political life.
Law's focus is also on truth, but it offers a different vision from prophecy
or philosophy of where truth is lodged and how best to access and acquire
it.
I have spent part of this
of my academic life explicating that tense
"coexistence of opposites, of prophecy and law, charisma and institution,"
in rabbinic thought. Now I am turning my attention to how irrational
and suprarational phenomena, such as magic and prophecy, fare when
subjected to rabbinic legal analysis-an analysis shaped, in turn, by a
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distinct conception of human psychology. That fine legal dissection of the
literary legacy of true and false prophecy, for example, led the talmudic
rabbis and their successors to reflect on universal issues of truth-acquisition and to question whether prophecy, which promises ultimate knowledge of the truth, is as uncertain and unreliable, if not more so, than
human reasoning. Their critique rested as much on the inherent limits of
human cognition as on the frailties of human psychology. Humans have
a limited capacity to distinguish truth from falsity or, as Maimonides
framed it, prophecy from sorcery. Moreover, the human actors who must
be trusted to convey God's words are capable of error as well as deceit,
self-deception, illusion, and resistance to the world as it is. This sober yet
passionate attention to human psychology links the rabbinic texts to those
formative texts of Dodds and Jonas, whose works still resonate with me.

